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Cyber Crime and Punishment:  
Filtering Out Internet Felons 
Jessica Habib* 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 21, 2003, Kevin Mitnick once again became a free 
man.1  In 1999, the hacker once labeled “the most-wanted 
computer criminal in U.S. history” by the government2 pled guilty 
to “possession of unauthorized access devices with intent to 
defraud in violation of [18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)].”3  Mitnick’s 
prison term ended in January 2000, after which he was subjected to 
a three-year period of supervised release.4  During this period, he 
was denied access to “computers, computer-related equipment and 
certain telecommunications devices, including cellular 
telephones,” without the prior approval of his probation officer.5  
The terms of Mitnick’s release prohibited him from using the 
Internet during this period,6 a probation condition that has become 
a controversial issue and has generated disagreement among the 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.A. Wesleyan 
University, 1999.  The author would like to thank Professor Joel Reidenberg for his 
comments and encouragement.  She also would like to thank her family for its abundant 
love and support throughout law school and beyond. 
 1 See Matt Richtel, Barring Web Use After Web Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2003, at 
A1. 
 2 Id. 
 3 United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *1 (9th 
Cir. May 20, 1998). 
 4 See Richtel, supra note 1 (noting that Mitnick was released from prison in January 
2000 and that he could not use the Internet until January 2003). 
 5 Mitnick, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2. 
 6 See Richtel, supra note 1. 
HABIB FORMAT 8/6/2004  4:05 PM 
1052 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 14:1051 
courts.7  According to Mitnick, “‘[n]ot being allowed to use the 
Internet is kind of like not being allowed to use a telephone’”8—an 
argument that has been embraced by some courts.9  On the other 
hand, proponents of banning Internet access by cyber-criminals 
focus on the Internet’s role in committing the crime and reject the 
argument that Internet restrictions entail a great hardship.10 
The abundant data on the extent of Internet use shows that the 
Internet has become an indispensable tool for a myriad of uses.11  
As such, it has revolutionized information gathering and 
communication and has transformed the economy.12  The number 
of people using online resources has grown rapidly in recent years 
and continues to proliferate.13  For these reasons, it seems that 
supervised release conditions that ban or restrict Internet use would 
hamper an individual’s access to an extremely valuable medium 
and, thus, should not be permitted.  In fact, several felons have 
challenged such deprivations as unconstitutional, often based on 
First Amendment guarantees of freedom of association and of the 
press.14  Sentencing courts, however, are granted wide discretion in 
determining supervised release conditions and must balance the 
protection of the public with the liberty interests of the convicted 
individual.15  In so doing, some courts have given greater weight to 
the former consideration and have upheld the conditions;16 others 
have emphasized the latter in rejecting such sentencing 
conditions.17  In light of the broad discretion of the courts, they 
clearly have the authority to impose such conditions.  Courts 
 
 7 See id. (noting that U.S. circuit courts of appeal have reached different conclusions 
as to the validity of Internet-use restrictions). 
 8 Associated Press, F.C.C. Lets Convicted Hacker Go Back On Air (Dec. 27, 2002) 
[hereinafter Associated Press, Hacker Back On Air], available at 2003 WL 3734116. 
 9 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 10 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 11 See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 12 See id. 
 13 See id. 
 14 E.g., United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 
U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *1 (9th Cir. May 20, 1998); see also discussion infra Part 
III.B (discussing First Amendment challenges to probation conditions). 
 15 See discussion infra Part I.A. 
 16 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 17 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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determining the appropriateness of such conditions, however, 
should focus narrowly on the Internet’s role in facilitating the 
crime and whether the restriction will prevent the underlying 
criminal conduct. 
Part I of this Note will introduce the federal guidelines and 
goals used to determine supervised release conditions and will 
discuss the extent to which the Internet has become a routine and 
necessary feature of society.  Part II will address the split among 
courts that have upheld or overturned Internet-use bans as a part of 
supervised release.  Part III will explore the factors that these 
courts have employed in making their decisions by distinguishing 
different types of computer crime and comparing the ban on 
Internet use to other instances where convicts have been deprived 
of what are normally considered fundamental rights and liberties.  
This part will argue that given the pervasiveness of Internet use in 
modern society and the Internet’s fundamental role in facilitating 
communication, courts should tailor supervised release conditions 
carefully to reflect how the Internet use related to the criminal act. 
I. SENTENCING DISCRETION VERSUS THE NATURE  
OF THE INTERNET 
At the heart of the controversy surrounding supervised release 
restrictions on Internet use is the tension between the broad 
discretion courts may exercise in the area of supervised release 
conditions and the Internet’s pervasiveness in modern society.18  A 
court must use its discretion to consider its competing obligations 
to society and to the convict poised to reenter society, with certain 
statutory criteria to guide its decisions.19  These decisions become 
even more complex if the realities of modern life—in this case, the 
 
 18 See generally Brian W. McKay, Note, Guardrails on the Information Superhighway: 
Supervising Computer Use of the Adjudicated Sex Offender, 106 W. VA. L. REV. 203, 
219–33 (2003) (discussing the split among U.S. circuit courts of appeal with respect to 
Internet bans). 
 19 See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL  §§ 5D1.1–.3 (guidelines 
on imposing a term of supervised release); see also Harold Baer, Jr., The Alpha & Omega 
of Supervised Release, 60 ALB. L. REV. 267, 269–85 (1996) (discussing the requirements 
for imposing a term of supervised release). 
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extent to which the Internet has become an essential means of 
communication—are also considered. 
A. Sentencing Guidelines and Goals 
In general, courts may exercise considerable discretion in 
determining whether to sentence an offender to a term of 
supervised release and what the conditions should be, limited by 
the class of felony.20  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583, a court choosing to 
include such a term must impose on the defendant certain 
mandatory restrictions, principally addressing the commission of 
other crimes as well as the use of controlled substances.21  In 
addition, the penultimate sentence of section 3583(d) states that a 
court may order “any other condition it considers to be 
appropriate,”22 thus conferring broad discretion upon courts to 
establish further conditions. 
The judgment of the courts is subject to three limitations, 
however.  First, section 3583(d)(1) states that the condition must 
be “reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), 
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D).”23  These factors are “the nature 
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant”24 and the need for the sentence, inter alia, to 
deter criminal conduct, protect the public, and provide the 
 
 20 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2000) (inclusion of a term of supervised release 
after imprisonment); 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (listing the authorized time periods of 
supervised release for each class of felony, the longest of which is five years). 
 21 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (conditions of supervised release). 
 22 Id.  The section states, in pertinent part: 
The court may order, as a further condition of supervised release, to the extent 
that such condition— 
(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), 
(a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); 
(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for 
the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and 
(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a);  
any condition set forth as a discretionary condition of probation in section 
3563(b)(1) through (b)(10) and (b)(12) through (b)(20), and any other 
condition it considers to be appropriate. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 23 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). 
 24 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (2000). 
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defendant with educational training or medical care.25  Several 
courts have found Internet bans appropriate based on these 
factors,26 suggesting that this provision of Section 3583(d) does not 
significantly limit a sentencing court’s discretion.27 
Second, section 3583(d)(2) sets forth another important 
limitation, prohibiting the infliction of any “greater deprivation of 
liberty than reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in 
section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C) and (a)(2)(D).”28  This factor has 
been critical in the decisions of several appeals courts to reject 
release conditions prohibiting Internet access, based upon their 
perception of the role of the Internet with respect to everyday 
activities.29  The third limitation is that the condition must be 
“consistent with any pertinent policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(a),” which 
generally refers to various provisions and purposes of title 18.30 
 
 25 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). 
 26 See infra Part II.B. 
 27 For example, in United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999), the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit needed only one paragraph to find a district court’s 
Internet restrictions acceptable under the standards of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1). See id. at 
127–28.  The issue under section 3583(d)(2)—whether the restrictions constituted a 
greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary—received more extensive 
analysis. See id. at 128. 
 28 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2); see also supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text (listing 
the relevant provisions of  18 U.S.C. § 3553). 
 29 See infra Part II.A. 
 30 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(3).  18 U.S.C. § 994(a) states: 
The Commission, by affirmative vote of at least four members of the 
Commission, and pursuant to its rules and regulations and consistent with all 
pertinent provisions of any Federal statute shall promulgate and distribute to all 
courts of the United States and to the United States Probation System— 
  (1) guidelines, as described in this section, for use of a sentencing court in 
determining the sentence to be imposed in a criminal case, including— 
  (A) a determination whether to impose a sentence to probation, a fine, or a 
 term of imprisonment; 
  (B) a determination as to the appropriate amount of a fine or the appropriate 
length of a term of probation or a term of imprisonment; 
  (C) a determination whether a sentence to a term of imprisonment should 
include a requirement that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised 
release after imprisonment, and, if so, the appropriate length of such a term; 
  (D) a determination whether multiple sentences to terms of imprisonment 
should be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively; and 
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Clearly, courts have the authority to decide that an offender 
should be banned from using the Internet, as long as this condition 
comports with the factors described above.  The question remains, 
however, whether this power should be used to fashion such a 
condition, given the Internet’s prevalence in modern society.  The 
difficulty lies in balancing the sentencing goals of  protecting the 
public and the liberty of the individual, in a context where the 
Internet has become synonymous with the free flow of 
information, ideas, and communication. 
B. Internet Use 
Much of the information about Internet use that the courts rely 
upon seems to be based on anecdotal evidence,31 but there is a 
great deal of empirical evidence on the subject as well.32  Several 
courts, such as those in United States v. Sofsky,33 United States v. 
Peterson,34 and United States v. White35 have emphasized the 
 
  (E) a determination under paragraphs (6) and (11) of section 3563(b) of title 
18; 
  (2) general policy statements regarding application of the guidelines or any 
other aspect of sentencing or sentence implementation that in the view of the 
Commission would further the purposes set forth in section 3553(a)(2) of title 
18, United States Code, including the appropriate use of— 
  (A) the sanctions set forth in sections 3554, 3555, and 3556 of title 18; 
  (B) the conditions of probation and supervised release set forth in sections 
3563(b) and 3583(d) of title 18; 
  (C) the sentence modification provisions set forth in sections 3563(c), 3564, 
3573, and 3582(c) of title 18; 
  (D) the fine imposition provisions set forth in section 3572 of title 18; 
  (E) the authority granted under rule 11(e)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure to accept or reject a plea agreement entered into pursuant to rule  
11(e)(1); and 
  (F) the temporary release provisions set forth in section 3622 of title 18, and 
the prerelease custody provisions set forth in section 3624(c) of title 18; and 
  (3) guidelines or general policy statements regarding the appropriate use of 
the provisions for revocation of probation set forth in section 3565 of title 18, 
and the provisions for modification of the term or conditions of supervised 
release and revocation of supervised release set forth in section 3583(e) of title 
18. 
 31 See, e.g., infra notes 78, 99–101 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 39–65. 
 33 287 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 34 248 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 35 244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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ubiquity of the Internet in overturning sentencing conditions that 
banned Internet use.36  Courts affirming such restrictions, such as 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. 
Crandon,37 have acknowledged the Internet’s prevalence, but 
ultimately justified their rulings on alternative factors.38 
The Internet’s pervasiveness and explosive growth is well 
described in a 2002 U.S. Commerce Department Report, titled “A 
Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the 
Internet” (“Commerce Department report”): “Few technologies 
have spread as quickly, or become so widely used, as computers 
and the Internet.  These information technologies are rapidly 
becoming common fixtures of modern social and economic life, 
opening opportunities and new avenues for many Americans.”39  
Indeed, a significant portion of the population now relies on the 
Internet to conduct various activities of daily life, as it is a 
powerful tool with countless practical uses, including 
communication, education, research, employment, shopping, and 
entertainment.40  According to Jeffrey Cole, director of the 
University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”) Center for 
Communication Policy, “The Internet has surpassed all other major 
information sources in importance after only about eight years as a 
generally available communications tool.”41  A year-to-year UCLA 
study found that among Internet users, the Internet ranked above 
books, newspapers, television, radio, and magazines as a very 
important or extremely important information source.42 
 
 36 See infra Part II.A. 
 37 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 38 See infra Part II.B. 
 39 DEP’T OF COMMERCE, A NATION ONLINE: HOW AMERICANS ARE EXPANDING THEIR 
USE OF THE INTERNET 1 (2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn (last 
visited Mar. 24, 2004).  The report, generated with U.S. Census Bureau data, was jointly 
prepared by two Commerce Department agencies: the Economics and Statistics 
Administration and the National Telecommunications and Information Administration. 
See id. 
 40 See infra notes 42–65. 
 41 Dawn Kawamoto, Net Ranks as Top Information Source, ZD Net News, at 
http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-982995.html (Jan. 31, 2003). 
 42 See UCLA CTR. FOR COMMUNICATION POLICY, THE UCLA INTERNET REPORT: 
SURVEYING THE DIGITAL FUTURE 82 (2003) (noting that nearly three-quarters of Internet 
users consider the Internet to be a very important or extremely important source of 
information, a ranking higher than for books, television, radio, newspapers, or 
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Other studies have focused on the types of information 
gathered on the Internet, demonstrating that its utility as an 
information source has many aspects.43  For example, one study 
concluded that about two-thirds of all Americans, Internet users 
and non-users alike, expect to find information about health care, 
government agencies, news, and commerce on the Internet.44  
Among Internet users alone, the study concluded that about eighty 
percent expected to find such information online.45  Furthermore, 
thirty-nine percent of all Americans said that they would first turn 
to the Internet for government information, and thirty-one percent 
would first look online for health-care information.46  Along with 
underscoring expectations about the accessibility and dependability 
of this information, this result also indicates that people are willing 
to rely on the Internet as their initial source of information about 
two essential, even personal, issues.  Indeed, the court in United 
States v. White compared the Internet to books, based on the 
instant access to the information it provides.47 
 
magazines), available at http://ccp.ucla.edu/pages/internet-report.asp (last visited Mar. 
19, 2004). 
 43 See JOHN B. HORRIGAN & LEE RAINIE, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, 
COUNTING ON THE INTERNET 5 (2002) (“The dissemination of the Internet has transformed 
how many Americans find information and altered how they engage with many 
institutions, such as government, health care providers, the news media, and commercial 
enterprises.”), available at http://www.pewInternet.org/reports/toc.asp?Report=80 (last 
visited April 8, 2004). 
 44 See id. at 2.  The study found that sixty-five percent of all Americans expect to find 
government-agency information or services on the World Wide Web. Id.  Additionally, 
sixty-three percent of all Americans expect that a business will have a Web site giving 
them information about a product they are considering buying; sixty-nine percent expect 
to find reliable, current news online; and sixty-seven percent expect to find reliable 
information about health or medical conditions on the Web. Id. 
 45 See id.  The study found that eighty-two percent of Internet users expect to find to 
find government-agency information or services online; seventy-nine percent expect that 
a business will have a Web site giving them information about a product they are 
considering buying; eighty-five percent expect to find reliable, current news online; and 
eighty-one percent expect to find reliable information about health or medical conditions 
on the Web. Id. 
 46 Id. at 8. 
 47 See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001) (“The 
communication facilitated by [information technology] may be likened to that of the 
telephone.  Its instant link to information is akin to opening a book.”). 
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With Internet use expanding across the population—regardless 
of income, education, race, age, ethnicity, or gender48—the 
Internet also is furthering democratic governance by helping local 
officials and their constituents communicate.49  A Pew Internet & 
American Life Project (“Pew”) survey of 2,000 mayors and city 
council members concluded that “local officials have embraced the 
Internet as part of their official lives and most now use email to 
communicate with constituents,” noting that that eighty-eight 
percent of local officials use the Internet in the course of their 
official duties.50  Among these “online officials,” sixty-one percent 
use e-mail to communicate with citizens at least weekly, and 
seventy-five percent use the World Wide Web (“Web”) at least 
weekly for research in the course of their official duties.51  
Furthermore, the survey indicated that local officials learn about 
their constituents’ activities and opinions through the Internet, and 
more local groups are getting recognized or heard in this fashion.52  
Therefore, in addition to learning about government services on the 
Internet, people are increasingly going online to communicate with 
their representatives and to participate in civic affairs, while 
elected officials have turned to the Internet to communicate with 
their constituents.53  The Internet is not the exclusive method by 
which citizens participate in government, but such use will likely 
 
 48 See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 1. 
 49 See Christopher Swope, E-Gov’s New Gear, GOVERNING, Mar. 2004 (noting that 
states, cities, and counties are “trying out new modes of interactivity, channeling public 
participation both over the Internet and in face-to-face high-tech town hall meetings”), 
available at http://www.governing.com/archive/2004/mar/interact.txt (last visited April 9, 
2004). 
 50 ELENA LARSEN & LEE RAINIE, DIGITAL TOWN HALL 1 (2002) (prepared for the Pew 
Internet & American Life Project), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/-
toc.asp?Report=74 (last visited March 25, 2004). 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id.  The report does caution, however, that “while the use of email adds to the 
convenience and depth of civic exchanges, its use is not ushering a revolution in 
municipal affairs or local politics.” Id. 
 53 See, e.g., Charles Bermant, E-Mails to Officials Can Help You Blow Off Steam, 
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2004 (urging residents to write e-mail messages to local officials 
and stating that letter writers “should expect an individual look-in-the-eye response”), 
available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/inbox/2001833798_ptinbo10.html 
(last visited March 25, 2004). 
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continue to grow, potentially putting those deprived of Internet use 
at a disadvantage in these essential matters. 
Searching for employment is another rapidly growing type of 
Internet use.54  Between March 2000 and May 2002, the number of 
Americans who looked for employment online increased by sixty 
percent, according to another Pew study.55  Although percentages 
of Internet users looking for jobs online vary by sex, race, age, and 
class, forty-seven percent of all adult Internet users in the United 
States have looked online for job information.56  In addition, the 
study found that fifty-two million Americans have looked on the 
Web for information about jobs, “and more than [four] million do 
so on a typical day.”57  Furthermore, this study indicates that many 
have found the Internet useful in obtaining additional job 
training.58  These numbers show that the Internet is now widely 
used for researching employment opportunities.  Some obvious 
reasons for this growth include the efficiency of using online 
services, such as Vault.com and Monster.com, to research job 
opportunities throughout the country and distribute résumés, as 
well as the facility with which users can search online editions of 
newspapers from other locales.59 
The Internet is not only widely used to find employment, but 
also has become ubiquitous in the workplace as well.60  Employed 
 
 54 See infra notes 55–59; see also Lorraine Farquharson, The Best Way to . . . 
Find a Job, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2003 (discussing different ways to use the Internet to 
find a job). 
 55 ANGIE BOYCE & LEE RAINIE, ONLINE JOB HUNTING 1 (July 2002) (prepared for the 
Pew Internet & American Life Project), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/reports/-
toc.asp?Report=65 (last visited March 25, 2004). 
 56 Id. at 2. 
 57 Id. at 1. 
 58 See id. at 2 (stating that of the forty-seven million Internet users who had sought 
additional career education or training in the preceding two years, twenty-nine percent 
reported that their use of the Internet played an important role in their securing the 
training). 
 59 For example, the New York Times Web site provides access to job listings at 
http://www.nytimes.com/pages/jobs/index.html. 
 60 See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 60 (“The workplace provides an 
important venue for many adults to use computers and the Internet.”); DEBORAH 
FALLOWS, EMAIL AT WORK: FEW FEEL OVERWHELMED AND MOST ARE PLEASED WITH THE 
WAY EMAIL HELPS THEM DO THEIR JOBS 5 (2002) (prepared for the Pew Internet & 
HABIB FORMAT 8/6/2004  4:05 PM 
2004] FILTERING OUT INTERNET FELONS 1061 
adults ages twenty-five and over use their computer at work more 
frequently to access the Internet and e-mail than for any other 
purpose, including word processing, desktop publishing, 
spreadsheets, databases, and graphics and design, according to the 
Commerce Department report.61  About forty-two percent of these 
workers used the Internet and e-mail at work by September 2001, 
up from about twenty-six percent in August 2000.62  These figures 
demonstrate that Internet use at work has become prevalent and 
continues to grow, likely due to the ease with which the Internet 
allows people to communicate.  This is an important consideration 
with respect to Internet use restrictions, especially since such a 
restriction could last up to five years under the sentencing 
guidelines, depending on the class of felony.63 
As yet another Pew study emphasizes, people increasingly turn 
to the Internet at “major life moments.”64  Of those Internet users 
who had experienced one of the major life moments identified in 
the survey over a certain period, the greatest proportion said that 
the Internet played a crucial role in choosing a school or college 
(thirty-six percent), followed by starting a new hobby (thirty-three 
percent), obtaining additional career training (twenty-nine percent), 
buying a new car (twenty-seven percent), helping another person 
deal with a major illness (twenty-six percent), and changing jobs 
(twenty-five percent).65 
These results, as well as the findings discussed above, illustrate 
the myriad of Internet applications to daily life, in which the quest 
for information is the common denominator.  The growth of 
Internet use is both rapid and widespread, and the variety of 
 
American Life Project) (“The use of email has become almost mandatory in most U.S. 
workplaces.”). 
 61 See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 60. 
 62 Id. at 57, 60. 
 63 See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b) (2000). 
 64 See NATHAN KOMMERS & LEE RAINIE, USE OF THE INTERNET AT MAJOR LIFE 
MOMENTS 2 (2002) (prepared for the Pew Internet & American Life Project) (stating that 
information on the Web is important to significant numbers of Americans when they are 
making important choices related to education and job training, investments and large 
purchases, and health care), available at http://www.pewInternet.org/reports/toc.asp?-
Report=58 (last visited March 21, 2004). 
 65 Id. at 3.  The survey questioned 1,415 Internet users about a total of 15 different 
major life events. Id. at 2. 
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matters for which people increasingly seek information online—
from mundane personal choices to significant life decisions—
demonstrate a high level of comfort with the information it has to 
offer.66 
The conclusion to the Commerce Department report states in 
part: 
The Internet has become a tool that is accessible to and 
adopted by Americans in communities across the 
nation.. . .As a result, we are more and more becoming a 
nation online: a nation that can take advantage of the 
information resources provided by the Internet, as well as a 
nation developing the technical skills to compete in our 
global economy.67 
In addition to its many social and other practical uses, the 
Internet is a necessary tool of economic competition, which begs 
the question: to what extent does deprivation of its use put people 
at an economic disadvantage?68  The numerous surveys and studies 
regarding Internet usage establish an important backdrop against 
 
 66 See Toni Fitzgerald, America’s Growing Web Dependence, MEDIA LIFE (discussing a 
Pew Internet & American Life Project study and expressing surprise at “how quickly 
Americans have come to trust the information” found on the Internet), at 
http://www.medialifemagazine.com/news2003/jan03/jan20/5_fri/news1friday.html (Jan. 
24, 2003); Press Release, UCLA Ctr. for Communication Policy, First Release of 
Findings From the UCLA World Internet Project Shows Significant ‘Digital Gender Gap’ 
in Many Countries (Jan. 14, 2004) (statement of Director Jeffrey Cole) (stating that most 
Internet users worldwide “generally trust the information they find online”), available at 
http://ccp.ucla.edu/pages/NewsTopics.asp?Id=45 (last visited Apr. 9, 2004). 
 67 See DEP’T OF  COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 91. 
 68 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that restrictions on Internet use and computer ownership constitute “an occupational 
restriction” and noting that the items prohibited under the conditions “include technology 
that [the defendant] would likely need to hold any computer-related job”); see also Doug 
Hyne, Note, Examining the Legal Challenges to the Restriction of Computer Access as a 
Term of Probation or Supervised Release, 28 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
215, 216 (2002) (“[O]ne can foresee a future where the majority of occupations will, at 
least in some way, necessitate that an employee use the internet.  In light of this fact, 
restricting the use of the internet as a term of probation may hamper an individual from 
gaining employment.”). 
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which to examine supervised release conditions that may limit 
access to the Internet’s abundant uses.69 
II. CONFLICTING APPROACHES TO INTERNET CRIME SENTENCING 
There are several key factors that the federal appeals courts 
have weighed in their consideration of supervised release 
conditions that ban Internet access, computer use, or both.70  
Outcomes have often turned on a particular court’s view of the role 
of the Internet and whether its use was incidental or necessary to 
commit the crime.71  While such cases require the examination of 
several criteria, the principal factors may be gleaned from these 
highly fact-specific cases.72 
A. Indispensability of the Internet and the Deprivation of Liberty 
Some courts have concluded that a member of modern society 
cannot afford to be without Internet or computer access, and, thus, 
generally have overturned prohibitions on Internet use during the 
supervised release period.73  The Second Circuit, for example, 
developed a position on the Internet to which it has adhered rather 
strictly in two such decisions.74  In United States v. Peterson,75 the 
court struck down an Internet ban imposed on a felon who had pled 
guilty to bank larceny, was previously convicted of incest, and had 
 
 69 See Richtel, supra note 1 (statement of Jennifer S. Granick, Director, Stanford Center 
for Internet and Society) (“The A.T.M. is a computer; the car has a computer; the Palm 
Pilot is a computer.  Without a computer in this day and age, you can’t work, you can’t 
communicate, you can’t function as people normally do in modern society.”). 
 70 See discussion infra Parts II.A–.B. 
 71 Compare Peterson, 248 F.3d at 82 (holding that restrictions on defendant’s computer 
ownership and Internet access are not reasonably related, inter alia, to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense), with United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (noting that defendant used the Internet “as a means to develop an illegal 
sexual relationship with a young girl” and concluding that a restriction on defendant’s 
Internet access is “related to the dual aims of deterring him from recidivism and 
protecting the public”). 
 72 See discussion infra Parts II.A–.B. 
 73 E.g., United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003); United States 
v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2002); Peterson, 248 F.3d at 81–84; United States 
v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206–08 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 74 See Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122; Peterson, 248 F.3d 79. 
 75 248 F.3d 79. 
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accessed legal adult pornography on his home computer.76  The 
court found that the prohibition was not “‘reasonably related’” to 
Peterson’s offense,77 and clarified its position with respect to the 
Internet: 
Computers and Internet access have become virtually 
indispensable in the modern world of communications and 
information gathering.  The fact that a computer with 
Internet access offers the possibility of abusive use for 
illegitimate purposes does not, at least in this case, justify 
so broad a prohibition.  Although a defendant might use the 
telephone to commit fraud, this would not justify a 
condition of probation that includes an absolute bar on the 
use of telephones.  Nor would defendant’s proclivity 
toward pornography justify a ban on all books, magazines, 
and newspapers.78 
In comparing the Internet to commonplace items such as the 
telephone and newspapers, the court signaled in this instance that 
the value of the Internet outweighed the potential for abuse.79  
Peterson’s Internet restrictions also prohibited the use of 
“‘commercial computer systems/services’ for employment 
purposes without a probation officer’s permission,”80 in addition to 
a complete ban on all technology (such as a CD-ROM and other 
storage devices) necessary to connect to the Internet or even to 
work at a computer-related job, as the Second Circuit noted.81  The 
court noted that the defendant “consistently worked in computer-
related jobs and, beginning in May 1997, operated his own 
computer business” and, thus, concluded that the Internet and 
computer restrictions were not reasonably related to the bank 
 
 76 Id. at 81, 84. 
 77 Id. at 82 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)). 
 78 Id. at 83 (computer restriction which “would bar [defendant] from using a computer 
at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a newspaper online” was 
excessively broad) (citing White, 244 F.3d at 1206). 
 79 See id.; see also Donna A. Gallagher, Comment, Free Speech on the Line: Modern 
Technology and the First Amendment, 3 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 197, 199 (1995) 
(arguing that although electronic bulletin board services can facilitate abuse, “the positive 
impact of the Internet greatly outweighs the negative”). 
 80 Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83. 
 81 See id. at 81, 83–84. 
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larceny conviction.82  The sentencing condition would 
unnecessarily hamper such employment during the supervised 
release period, the court found.83 
Applying the reasoning in Peterson, the Second Circuit 
reversed an Internet ban in another notable case, United States v. 
Sofsky.84  Gregory Sofsky pled guilty to receiving child 
pornography in light of evidence that he downloaded over 1,000 
images of child pornography from the Internet and exchanged 
images with others online.85  He was sentenced to ten years in 
prison, to be followed by a term of supervised release during 
which, inter alia, he was not allowed to access the computer or 
Internet without approval of a probation officer.86  Sofsky’s 
conduct was more closely related to the Internet than the offense in 
Peterson,87 and the conditions allowed Sofsky to obtain approved 
access.88  In addition, the court acknowledged that Sofsky’s access 
to computers and the Internet could “facilitate . . . his electronic 
receipt of child pornography.”89  The court relied on its stance in 
Peterson to vacate the ban and remand the case to the district court 
for a more restricted condition, however, finding that it “inflict[ed] 
a greater deprivation on Sofsky’s liberty than [was] reasonably 
necessary,”90 in the language of the federal supervised release 
guidelines.91 
The Sofsky court expanded upon the statement in Peterson that 
a defendant’s use of the telephone to commit fraud would not 
justify a complete ban on telephone use:92 “The same could be said 
of a prohibition on the use of the mails imposed on a defendant 
 
 82 Id. at 84. 
 83 See id. 
 84 See Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122. 
 85 Id. at 124. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that defendant in Peterson had 
pled guilty to bank larceny and was previously convicted of incest, and had accessed 
legal adult pornography on his home computer). 
 88 Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 124. 
 89 Id. at 126. 
 90 Id. 
 91 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 92 See Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126 (citing Peterson, 248 F.3d at 83); see also supra note 78 
and accompanying text. 
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convicted of mail fraud.  A total ban on Internet access prevents 
use of e-mail, an increasingly widely used form of 
communication . . . .”93  This line of reasoning indicates a 
reluctance to identify the Internet as the root of the underlying 
conduct, although in this case the court acknowledged that the 
Internet could facilitate the continuation of the criminal act for 
which the defendant was convicted.94  However, the fact that the 
Internet was incidental to the commission of the underlying 
crime—that is, the crime could have been committed without 
going online—may have made the court less willing to restrict 
access to the Internet for legitimate purposes.95  Although Sofsky 
could seek approval from his probation officer to use the Internet, 
the court still concluded that the condition was too restrictive, and 
that the possibility for abuse should not prevent access to such 
indispensable technology.96 
Other circuits have relied on similar reasoning.  For example, 
the Tenth Circuit in United States v. White was unwilling to uphold 
an Internet ban in the sentencing of Robert Emerson White, who 
was caught purchasing child pornography videos online by a 
government sting operation.97  The court took issue with the 
wording of the condition, which stated that White “‘shall not 
possess a computer with Internet access throughout his period of 
supervised release.’”98  The court thought that a restriction on the 
possession of a computer with Internet access “missed the mark” if 
the district court intended to prevent access to online child 
pornography, since White could simply access the Internet on a 
computer he did not own.99  The court also thought that if 
 
 93 Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126. 
 94 Id. at 126, 127. 
 95 The distinction between Internet crime and Internet-related crime is discussed further 
in Part III.A of this Note. 
 96 See Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126–27.  The court suggested that a more focused restriction, 
limited to pornography sites and images, could be enforced by unannounced inspections 
of the defendant’s premises and examination of material stored on his or her computer 
and software. Id. at 127.  In addition, the court noted that the government could conduct a 
sting operation on the defendant—“surreptitiously inviting him [or her] to respond to 
Government placed Internet ads for pornography.” Id. 
 97 United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 98 Id. at 1205. 
 99 Id. 
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“possess” were to entail “the concept of use,” however, then the 
condition was overbroad: 
That reading would bar White from using a computer at a 
library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a 
newspaper online.  Under these circumstances, the special 
condition is “greater than necessary,” and fails to balance the 
competing interests the sentencing court must consider.100 
The court clearly views the Internet as an essential tool with 
many basic uses, and, as in Peterson and Sofsky, associates it with 
other fundamental resources: “The communication facilitated by 
this technology may be likened to that of the telephone.  Its instant 
link to information is akin to opening a book.”101 
In this same vein, the Third Circuit denied an Internet ban 
where a felon pled guilty to possession and receipt of child 
pornography,102 which ostensibly did not involve the Internet.103  
The court relied heavily on Sofsky for the proposition that 
forbidding the felon, Robb Walker Freeman, from possessing a 
computer or using any online computer service without written 
permission of his probation officer was too great a deprivation of 
liberty.104  Furthermore, the court noted that it was not necessary to 
prevent “access to email or benign internet usage, when a more 
focused restriction, limited to pornography sites and images, can 
be enforced by unannounced inspections of material stored on 
Freeman’s hard drive or removable disks.”105 
Evidently, some courts have focused on the nature of the 
Internet as an indispensable tool with many practical and 
commonplace uses in rendering their decisions about conditions of 
supervised release that ban or severely restrict Internet use.106  
Even in situations where the Internet played a role in the 
commission of the crime, these courts have deemed a ban on 
 
 100 Id. at 1206 (citation omitted). 
 101 Id. at 1207. 
 102 United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 392 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 103 Id at 387. 
 104 See id. at 391–92. 
 105 Id. at 392. 
 106 E.g., Freeman, 316 F.3d 386; Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122; United States v. Peterson, 248 
F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2001); White, 244 F.3d 1199. 
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Internet use as a greater deprivation of liberty than allowed under 
the supervised release guidelines.107  Conversely, other courts have 
focused on the use of the Internet as essential tool to the 
commission of the crime in reviewing, and often upholding, 
Internet use prohibitions instituted by sentencing courts.108 
B. The Internet as a Tool of Crime and the Protection of the 
Public 
When the trial court in United States v. Mitnick imposed 
supervised release conditions on the infamous computer hacker 
Kevin Mitnick, preventing his use of computers without probation 
officer approval, he challenged the sentence as restrictive of his 
First Amendment rights.109  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit upheld the conditions in a terse, unreported opinion, 
stating simply: “[T]he conditions imposed are reasonably related to 
legitimate sentencing goals and are no more restrictive than 
necessary.”110  Mitnick broke into computer networks of large 
corporations and stole software, acts that necessitated the use of 
computers and the Internet.111  The Ninth Circuit relied on the 
broad sentencing discretion of the district court to dismiss 
Mitnick’s challenge, indicating that it viewed his computer use a 
threat to the public.112  This leads to the inference that the court 
considered the Internet an essential tool of Mitnick’s crimes, thus 
justifying the ban. 
In United States v. Crandon, another instance of an appellate 
court upholding an Internet restriction, Richard Crandon pled 
guilty to one count of receiving child pornography.113  His crime, 
however, entailed much more than downloading illicit material; 
Crandon met a fourteen-year-old girl online, ultimately meeting 
 
 107 E.g., Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122; White, 244 F.3d 1199. 
 108 E.g., United States v. Harding, No. 02-2102, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371 (3d Cir. 
Jan. 28, 2003); United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Crandon, 173 F.3d 122 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 
U.S. App. LEXIS 10836 (9th Cir. May 20, 1998). 
 109 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See Richtel, supra note 1. 
 112 Mitnick, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2. 
 113 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 124. 
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her in person to have sexual relations and take photographs of the 
encounter.114  Crandon and the girl repeatedly spoke over the 
telephone after the visit, discussing the prospect of his return to 
Minnesota to bring her to his home in New Jersey.115  Crandon 
returned to Minnesota the following month, at which time he and 
the girl departed for New Jersey, although along the way he 
learned that authorities were looking for them and, thus, he sent 
her back to Minnesota.116 
The Third Circuit acknowledged that “computer networks and 
the Internet will continue to become an omnipresent aspect of 
American life.”117  The court, however, rejected Crandon’s 
argument that the supervised release condition banning access to 
the Internet or other computer networks without approval of a 
probation officer was not logically related to his offense, violating 
his rights of speech and association.118  The court also rejected the 
argument that the restrictions preventing “access to any form of 
computer network”119 should be vacated because they hindered 
Crandon’s employment opportunities due to the extent in which 
businesses have “integrate[d] computers and the Internet into the 
workplace.”120 Rather, the court concluded that the restrictions on 
employment and First Amendment freedoms were acceptable 
because the special condition “[was] narrowly tailored and [was] 
directly related to deterring Crandon and protecting the public.”121 
The court apparently found a direct relationship between the 
Internet and the crime, unlike in Peterson,122 and was more 
influenced by the defendant’s use of the Internet to victimize a 
young girl than by his argument that the restriction would impede 
his employment opportunities or constitutional rights.123  Thus, the 
 
 114 Id. at 125. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 128. 
 118 See id. at 127–28. 
 119 Id. at 125. 
 120 See id. at 127–28. 
 121 Id. at 128. 
 122 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
 123 See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128 (rejecting defendant’s argument that “as businesses 
continue to integrate computers and the Internet into the workplace, the special condition 
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court emphasized that the Internet was the instrument by which 
Crandon developed a sexual relationship with the fourteen-year-
old girl, from their initial meeting to their continuous 
communication that resulted in his visit to Minnesota.124  The fact 
that the Internet was not merely incidental to the commission of 
the crime led the court to affirm the sentence as necessary to deter 
such future conduct and protect the public.125 
In United States v. Harding,126 the Third Circuit followed its 
decision in Crandon to uphold an Internet ban imposed on Jamie 
Harding, a man who was found with numerous photographs, 
computer disks, and videotapes containing pornographic images of 
children.127  The district court imposed supervised release 
conditions banning him from accessing the Internet without the 
prior approval of his probation officer.128  Although Harding was 
apparently permitted to own a computer, the court required him to 
consent to unannounced inspections of his computer equipment by 
a probation officer to ensure that he did not connect to an Internet 
server.129 
The opinion did not clarify whether the images found on 
Harding’s computer were retrieved from or distributed to others 
through the Internet;130 the court did indicate that he possessed a 
scanner,131 though that could simply mean that Harding preferred 
to store the images digitally.  Nonetheless, the court compared this 
instance to Crandon to conclude that the ban was justifiable given 
 
may hamper his employment opportunities upon release, as well as limit his freedoms of 
speech and association”). 
 124 See id. at 125, 127. 
 125 Id. at 127–28.  The court stated: 
In this case, Crandon used the Internet as a means to develop an illegal sexual 
relationship with a young girl over a period of several months.  Given these 
compelling circumstances, it seems clear that the condition of release limiting 
Crandon’s Internet access is related to the dual aims of deterring him from 
recidivism and protecting the public. 
Id. 
 126 No. 02-2102, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371 (3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2003). 
 127 Id. at *2. 
 128 Id. at *2–*3. 
 129 Id. at *3. 
 130 See id. at *2. 
 131 Id. 
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the interest in protecting the public and deterring future criminal 
conduct,132 although in Crandon the Internet was used to contact a 
future victim directly.133  Based on this distinction, Harding does 
not seem to fall “within the teachings of Crandon,”134 and seems to 
contradict the Third Circuit’s decision in Freeman (decided the 
same month as Harding) rejecting a ban on Internet use for a 
defendant who had been convicted of possessing child 
pornography that he had loaded into his computer.135  In fact, the 
Third Circuit distinguished Freeman from Crandon since there 
was no evidence that Freeman had used the Internet to contact 
young children,136 which also may have been the case in 
Harding.137  Furthermore, Harding contradicts the Second 
Circuit’s reasoning in Sofsky, which the Freeman court cited for 
the proposition that a ban on Internet use would prevent access to 
“benign internet usage.”138  In any event, there is some 
inconsistency within the Third Circuit as to what circumstances 
support Internet use restrictions as a condition of supervised 
release. 
In United States v. Paul, Ronald Scott Paul was restricted from 
using computers or the Internet in the wake of his prison sentence 
for knowing possession of child pornography after numerous 
pornographic images of children were found on his personal 
computer, in addition to the photographs, magazines, books, and 
videotapes containing similar images that were found in his 
home.139  Paul admitted to having downloaded the computer 
images from the Internet, but argued that the prohibition was too 
broad and would restrict his ability to use computers and the 
Internet for legitimate purposes.140  The court, however, chose 
instead to focus on Paul’s use of the Internet and e-mail “to 
encourage exploitation of children by seeking out fellow ‘boy 
 
 132 See id. at *4–*5. 
 133 See supra text accompanying note 114. 
 134 Harding, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371, at *5. 
 135 United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003). 
 136 Id. at 392. 
 137 See supra text accompanying notes 130–31. 
 138 Freeman, 316 F.3d at 392. 
 139 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 140 Id. at 168. 
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lovers’ and providing them with advice on how to find and obtain 
access to ‘young friends,’”141 and to “advise fellow consumers of 
child pornography how to ‘scout’ single, dysfunctional parents and 
gain access to their children and to solicit the participation of like-
minded individuals in trips to ‘visit’ children in Mexico.”142  As in 
Crandon, to which the court in this case analogized, much of 
Paul’s predatory behavior occurred through the Internet, which he 
used to “‘initiate and facilitate a pattern of criminal conduct and 
victimization.’”143  Thus, the court reasoned that Paul’s crime was, 
in fact, very closely related to the Internet and affirmed the ban.144 
The discussion above indicates that the role of the Internet in 
the commission of the crime is a crucial factor in the determination 
of whether to uphold a supervised release condition prohibiting its 
use, although this factor is not necessarily dispositive.145  For 
example, the Sofsky court overturned the Internet ban for a felon 
who used the Internet to download child pornography and to 
exchange it with others, focusing instead on the potential of such a 
restriction to infringe upon the defendant’s liberty.146  Sofsky’s 
conduct, however, was not as egregious as the use of the Internet to 
contact potential victims as in Crandon,147 or to teach others how 
to do the same as in Paul.148  Nonetheless, other factors bearing on 
whether courts should ban certain offenders from using the Internet 
altogether must be explored further. 
III. CRITERIA FOR DEVELOPING INTERNET USE RESTRICTIONS 
Internet bans only should be permitted in circumstances where 
they are warranted based upon narrow criteria because they have 
the potential to inhibit access to a number of resources with respect 
 
 141 Id. at 169. 
 142 Id. at 168. 
 143 Id. at 169 (quoting United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 2001)).  
Although the Paul court quoted the language of White, a case that overturned an Internet 
ban, it distinguished White factually and rejected its reasoning. See id. at 169–70. 
 144 Id. at 168–70. 
 145 See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 146 See supra notes 84–96. 
 147 See supra notes 113–25. 
 148 See supra notes 139–44. 
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to many different fundamental uses, such as communication, 
education, governance, and information gathering.149  While terms 
of supervised release tend to last only a few years,150 restrictions 
on Internet use may prevent people from further developing 
important skills, such as those required in the workplace.151  Such 
commonplace uses of the Internet are rapidly becoming essential 
and should not so readily be denied. 
As such, courts should consider the manner in which the 
Internet was employed to commit a crime when fashioning 
supervised release conditions that restrict Internet use.  Attempts 
have been made to create these distinctions, which focus on the 
nature of the underlying offense as well as the nature of the 
Internet use.152  In addition, comparing the deprivation of Internet 
use to other types of conditions that implicate certain rights, 
liberties, and commonplace activities is a useful method of 
analyzing the way in which courts exercise their sentencing 
discretion. 
A. Internet Crime Versus Internet-Related Crime 
While beneficial in countless ways, the advent of new 
technologies over recent decades also has given rise to numerous 
new types of crimes as well as new methods of committing crime 
in general.153  Accordingly, there have been attempts to reform 
 
 149 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 150 See, e.g., WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFENDERS RETURNING TO 
FEDERAL PRISON, 1986–97, at 2 (2000) (stating that the average term of supervised 
release imposed during 1998 was forty-one months), available at http://www.ojp.-
usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/orfp97.htm (last revised Sept. 22, 2000). 
 151 See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text. 
 152 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 153 See Mark D. Rasch, Criminal Law and the Internet, in THE INTERNET AND BUSINESS: 
A LAWYER’S GUIDE TO THE EMERGING LEGAL ISSUES 141, 141 (Joseph F. Ruh, Jr. ed., 
1996) (“While computer technology permits business to work more efficiently, 
communicate more effectively, and become more productive, the computer, as a tool, 
permits those with less benevolent intention to evade the law.  What’s worse, with the 
advent of new information technologies, more information—and more sensitive 
information—is stored in a manner which makes it more accessible to more individuals—
not all of whom have purely wholesome motives.”). 
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criminal laws to sufficiently address computer crime.154  In the 
process, distinctions between “computer crime” and “computer 
related crime” have arisen.155  Similarly, a significant distinction 
could be drawn between Internet crime and Internet-related crime, 
based on the respective relationships between the crimes and the 
Internet.156 
In attempting to define computer crime, one commentator 
suggested, “computer crime is a criminal offense for which the 
knowledge of computers is necessary for the successful 
commission of the offense.”157  An analysis of this definition 
states: 
Such a definition distinguishes true computer crimes from 
computer related crimes in which computers are used as 
tools or targets of the criminal offense, but for which 
knowledge of the workings of a computer is not essential 
for the successful commission of the offense.  Thus, a chain 
letter typed on a computer’s word processing software and 
thereafter mailed to victims of a fraudulent solicitation is 
probably not a computer crime, despite the fact that 
knowledge of the word processing software facilitated the 
commission of the offense.  A similar chain letter sent out 
over the Internet, and soliciting electronic funds transfers 
comes closer to a true computer crime especially if 
responses are electronically sorted or manipulated.158 
 
 154 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME & INTELL. PROP. SECTION, THE NATIONAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION ACT OF 1996: LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS (1997) 
(discussing why new computer crime legislation was needed), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/1030_anal.html (last updated July 31, 2003). 
 155 See Rasch, supra note 153, at 143. 
 156 For instance, Kevin Mitnick’s use of the Internet to hack into computer networks of 
large corporations should be categorized as an Internet crime, because the crime itself 
requires Internet technology. See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text.  By 
contrast, Gregory Sofsky’s crime—the receipt of child pornography—did not specifically 
require the Internet, although the Internet facilitated the crime’s commission. See United 
States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 2002).  Thus, such acts should be considered 
Internet-related crime. See infra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
 157 See Rasch, supra note 153, at 143 (citing DONN PARKER, FIGHTING COMPUTER CRIME 
(1983)). 
 158 Id. 
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Under these criteria, it would seem as if the simple use of the 
Internet to download illegal material, such as child pornography, 
would be considered an Internet-related crime.  Conversely, a more 
elaborate scheme requiring use of Internet technology to carry out 
the crime, such as hacking into protected servers and databases, 
would rise to the level of direct Internet crime. 
Furthermore, in addressing the need to update criminal laws 
with respect to computers, the Computer Crime and Intellectual 
Property Section of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has 
identified the different ways in which computers are connected to 
crime: 
First, a computer may be used as a target of the offense.  In 
these cases, the criminal’s goal is to steal information from, 
or cause damage to a computer, computer system, or 
computer network.  Second, the computer may be a tool of 
the offense.  This occurs when an individual uses a 
computer to facilitate some traditional offense such as fraud 
. . . . Last, computers are sometimes incidental to the 
offense, but significant to law enforcement because they 
contain evidence of a crime.159 
In addition, the DOJ has indicated that “[a]lthough certain 
computer crimes appear simply to be old crimes committed in new 
ways (e.g., the bank teller who uses a computer program to steal 
money is still committing bank fraud), some computer offenses 
find their genesis in [] new technologies and must be specifically 
addressed by statute.”160  Thus, some crimes involving computers 
are illegal due to underlying criminal conduct, but others arise out 
of specific use of certain technologies and could not be committed 
otherwise.161 
The above analysis regarding computers may be applied to the 
Internet to demonstrate that there are people who use the Internet 
to commit crimes that do not require online resources, crimes that 
 
 159 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 154. 
 160 See id.; Rasch, supra note 153, at 143. 
 161 See Jo-Ann M. Adams, Comment, Controlling Cyberspace: Applying the Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act to the Internet, 12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403, 
409–15 (1996) (discussing different categories of crimes committed on the Internet). 
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they might be predisposed to commit in any case, and there are 
people who commit crimes that require Internet technology.162  For 
example, in Kevin Mitnick’s infamous acts of hacking into 
corporate networks, computers and the Internet would be identified 
under this analysis as both a target and a tool of the offense.163  
Other cases are less clear on whether the Internet was a necessary 
tool, or merely incidental to the crime, however.  In the Internet 
child pornography cases such as Sofsky, White, and Harding, in 
which the defendants used the Internet to download or order illicit 
materials,164 computers and the Internet could be viewed either as 
incidental to the commission of the crime of possessing child 
pornography, or as tools to facilitate offenses that could have been 
committed in other ways.165 
This is a fine distinction, and although courts have broad 
discretion in imposing supervised release conditions, they should 
be careful in identifying which type of Internet use has occurred 
and whether banning Internet use will help deter the conduct 
underlying the offense, given the Internet’s pervasiveness and its 
many practical functions.166  For example, the Third Circuit likely 
would have reached a different result in Harding—in which it 
upheld an Internet ban for a defendant convicted of possessing 
child pornography on his computer167—if it had carefully 
scrutinized the extent to which the Internet was a required element 
in the commission of the offense, since child pornography has 
existed long before the advent of the Internet and surely can be 
obtained elsewhere.168  Crandon and Paul are less clear, but in 
 
 162 Compare United States v. Harding, No. 02-2102, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371, at *1  
(3d Cir. Jan. 28, 2003) (receiving child pornography), with United States v. Mitnick, No. 
97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *1 (9th Cir. May 20, 1998) (possession of 
unauthorized access devices with intent to defraud). 
 163 See supra notes 109–12 and accompanying text. 
 164 Harding upheld an Internet ban, while Sofsky and White overturned the restrictions. 
See discussion supra Part II. 
 165 See supra text accompanying notes 85, 97, 127 and accompanying text for 
descriptions of the offenses in these cases. 
 166 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 167 See supra text accompanying notes 126–38. 
 168 See Devon Ishii Peterson, Comment, Child Pornography on the Internet: The Effect 
of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 on Tort Recovery for Victims 
Against Internet Service Providers, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 763, 766–67 (2002) (discussing 
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those cases the courts perceived the defendants’ respective uses of 
the Internet to solicit contact with future victims (Crandon) or to 
find others with similar tastes willing to teach them how to target 
potential victims (Paul) as serious threats to public safety—threats 
uniquely furthered by the Internet.169  Certainly, these cases come 
closer to actual Internet crime than the crime in Harding, though 
they do not rise to the level of the crime in Mitnick, in which the 
use of Internet technology was essential to the hacker’s illegal 
breach of secure data systems.170 
A notable consideration in the analysis of Internet crime and 
Internet-related crime is that the anonymity, or pseudonymity as it 
were,171 afforded by the Internet likely emboldens offenders whose 
shame or fear of getting caught might otherwise make them more 
reluctant to commit certain offenses.172  In Crandon, the court 
identified the Internet as an “omnipresent” part of American life,173 
but upheld the Internet ban due to its role in initiating contact with 
the victim.174  As the Peterson court noted, however, use of the 
telephone to commit a crime such as fraud would not justify a 
condition of probation barring use of the telephone altogether,175 
and other courts have agreed.176  Interestingly, in Crandon, in 
which the defendant used the Internet to develop a rapport and 
eventually a sexual relationship with a young girl, the defendant 
and the girl communicated regularly over the telephone after their 
 
the history of commercial child pornography); Lesli C. Esposito, Note, Regulating the 
Internet: The New Battle Against Child Pornography,  30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 541, 
542–43 (1998) (naming several child pornographic magazines and noting that child 
pornography exists in many forms). 
 169 See supra notes 124–25, 142–44 and accompanying text. 
 170 See Greg Miller, Hacking Legend’s Sign-Off, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1999, at A1 
(discussing Mitnick’s crimes). 
 171 See Rasch, supra note 153, at 143. 
 172 See id. at 144 (discussing how the anonymity provided by the Internet can impact a 
user’s behavior). 
 173 United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 128 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Unquestionably, 
computer networks and the Internet will continue to become an omnipresent aspect of 
American life.”). 
 174 See supra notes 117–25 and accompanying text. 
 175 See supra text accompanying note 78. 
 176 See, e.g., United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001); supra text 
accompanying note 101. 
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initial encounter.177  Nevertheless, the fact that Crandon used the 
telephone to maintain contact with his young victim did not factor 
into the sentencing determination, though perhaps it should have in 
light of the court’s justification of the Internet ban.178  The court 
either viewed the Internet as the principal and more insidious 
device with which Crandon preyed on the young girl to solicit 
sexual contact, or it took for granted the essential nature of the 
telephone.179  The role of the Internet in the commission of the 
crime is an important consideration with respect to sentencing 
conditions, and courts tending to enforce Internet bans seem to 
have done so based on the ease with which people can 
communicate and obtain information online.180 
Whether the Internet facilitated the crime was a crucial part of 
the conclusions of the courts, particularly for those courts putting 
less emphasis on the extent of the Internet’s role in modern 
society.181  As discussed above, however, the Internet has become 
an indispensable medium, access to which should not readily be 
denied.182  For this reason, courts carefully should distinguish 
Internet crime from Internet-related crime, as the inquiry with the 
latter relates more to the underlying offense for which the 
defendant has been convicted, and craft supervised release 
conditions more narrowly in order to prevent deprivation of 
technology whose prevalence and usefulness continues to grow 
exponentially. 
 
 177 See Crandon, 173 F.3d at 125, 127. 
 178 See id. at 127–28. 
 179 Cf. United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001) (vacating Internet 
restrictions and stating that “[a]lthough a defendant might use the telephone to commit 
fraud, this would not justify a condition of probation that includes an absolute bar on the 
use of telephones”); United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1207 (10th Cir. 2001) 
(vacating Internet restrictions and stating that the communication facilitated by Internet 
technology “may be likened to that of the telephone”). 
 180 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 181 See, e.g., United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e reject 
the White court’s implication that an absolute prohibition on accessing computers or the 
Internet is per se an unacceptable condition of supervised  release, simply because such a 
prohibition might prevent a defendant from using a computer at the library to ‘get a 
weather forecast’ or to ‘read a newspaper online’ during the supervised release term. 
(quoting United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2001))). 
 182 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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B. Supervised Release Conditions With Respect to Other Rights 
and Liberties 
A great impediment to calling upon sentencing courts to limit 
the use of Internet bans, regardless of the role of the Internet in the 
commission of the crime, is that previous arguments against 
supervised release restrictions as unconstitutional or as intruding 
on other perceived liberties have been largely rejected.183  In the 
decisions discussed above, which overturned Internet bans, none of 
the courts rejected the restrictions as unconstitutional, but rather 
cited to the sentencing guidelines standard that the condition must 
not involve a “greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably 
necessary.”184  In general, First Amendment challenges to 
probation conditions, such as those in Mitnick185 and Crandon,186 
have been unsuccessful.  The Crandon court cited the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Ritter 
for the proposition that “‘even though supervised release 
conditions may affect constitutional rights such as First 
Amendment protections, most restrictions are valid if directly 
related to advancing the individual’s rehabilitation and to 
protecting the public from recidivism.’”187 
1. Freedom of Association 
Several cases have addressed restrictions on freedom of 
association,188 a right that specifically relates to the function of the 
Internet as a communication and information-sharing medium.189  
 
 183 See, e.g., United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28 (3d Cir. 1999); United 
States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2 (9th Cir. May 20, 
1998). 
 184 See supra note 28 and accompanying text; see also discussion supra Part II.A. 
 185 Mitnick, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *2. 
 186 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 127–28. 
 187 Id. at 128 (quoting United States v. Ritter, 118 F.3d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
 188 E.g., United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. 
Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991); Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554 (9th 
Cir. 1974); see also Stephen S. Cook, Selected Constitutional Questions Regarding 
Federal Offender Supervision, 23 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1, 3–5 (1997) 
(discussing First Amendment concerns arising in the federal sentencing and probation 
process). 
 189 See Hyne, supra note 68, at 239–40 (discussing First Amendment challenges to the 
restriction of computer access as a condition of probation or supervised release). 
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Thus, it can be argued that an Internet ban would prevent 
association with those generally contacted through this medium.190  
The two principal concerns supporting limitations on freedom of 
association are rehabilitation and public safety.191  In addition, 
freedom of association cases relate to supervised release conditions 
that require filtering Internet use or permitting access subject to 
probation officer approval, since in both instances the restrictions 
seek to prevent specific activities or contact related to the 
offense.192 
In one case, relied upon by the Mitnick court in its rejection of 
the constitutional challenge presented, a defendant pleaded guilty 
to “being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm” and was 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment followed by a period of 
supervised release during which he could not be involved “in any 
motorcycle club activities.”193  The Ninth Circuit rejected the 
defendant’s freedom of association challenge, referring to the 
sentencing court’s broad discretion as well as to a judicial 
articulation of sentencing principles: “Probation conditions may 
seek to prevent reversion into a former crime-inducing life-style by 
barring contact with old haunts and associates, even though the 
activities may be legal.”194  Similarly, another court upheld the 
restriction preventing a white supremacist leader who pled guilty 
to possession of an unregistered firearm from associating with 
skinheads or any neo-Nazi or white supremacist organization.195  
The defendant did not appeal the condition of not associating with 
white supremacist organizations, but he did appeal the requirement 
barring association with other skinheads or neo-Nazis.196  The 
sentencing court explained the correlation between the restriction 
and the crime: “‘Because those groups embrace violence and the 
 
 190 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128. 
 191 See Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 480 (holding that restriction on defendant’s association 
rights is valid if primarily designed to meet the ends of rehabilitation and protection of 
the public, and reasonably related to such ends) (citing United States v. Terrigno, 838 
F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
 192 See Hyne, supra note 68, at 240 (discussing how Internet use can be considered 
“associating”). 
 193 Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 479 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 194 Id. at 480 (citing Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 556–57 (9th Cir. 1974)). 
 195 See United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 196 Id. 
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threat of violence as a method of advancing their views, [the court 
found] that [his] association with them would create a high 
likelihood that [he] would be drawn into that same 
behavior.. . .’”197  Affirming this part of the sentencing court’s 
ruling, the appellate court found that “the district court was correct 
that [the defendant] need[ed] to be separated from other members 
of white supremacist groups to have a chance of staying out of 
trouble.”198 
These cases are relevant in the Internet context because the 
freedom to use the Internet, while not a constitutional right itself, 
necessarily implicates freedom of speech and association.199  These 
cases make clear, however, that a restriction will be upheld despite 
a constitutional challenge if it appears likely that a certain forum 
could lead to future misconduct of the same sort, a consideration 
underlying the supervised release conditions upheld in Crandon 
and Paul.200  In Crandon, for example, the defendant had utilized 
the Internet in a predatory manner;201 the Paul defendant went 
online partly to counsel others on victimizing children.202  
Likewise, the Mitnick court upheld the restriction on computer-
related employment in order to protect the public by preventing the 
defendant from engaging in his former criminal activities.203 
Because several of the Internet ban cases discussed above 
pertain to child pornography, an examination of freedom of 
association cases of this kind is worthwhile, especially with respect 
to the public safety element that such cases necessarily 
 
 197 Id. at 575. 
 198 Id. at 575–76. 
 199 See Hyne, supra note 68, at 239–40. 
 200 See supra notes 113–25, 139–44 and accompanying text. 
 201 United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999) (beginning a sexual 
relationship with a fourteen-year-old girl). 
 202 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 158 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 203 See Mitnick, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *3–*4.  Mitnick served five years in 
federal prison for stealing software and altering data at Motorola, Novell, Nokia, Sun 
Microsystems, and the University of Southern California. Associated Press, Hacker Back 
On Air, supra note 8.  Prosecutors accused him of causing tens of millions of dollars in 
damage to corporate computer networks. Id. 
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implicate.204  The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Bee205 upheld a 
supervised release condition whereby a child molester (1) could 
not have contact with any minors without probation officer 
approval; (2) could not loiter within a certain distance of schools, 
parks, playgrounds, arcades, or any other places primarily used by 
children; and (3) could not possess any sexually stimulating 
material considered inappropriate or patronize any place where 
such material is available.206  The facts in cases such Bee and 
Crandon make sympathy for the defendant difficult.207  Although 
the defendant in Bee claimed that the first two conditions were too 
broad and that the third condition was a First Amendment violation 
and unrelated to his offense, the court upheld all three 
restrictions.208  As to the conditions barring unapproved contact 
with children and preventing the defendant from loitering in places 
primarily used by children, the court quoted the defendant’s own 
acknowledgement that he would be expected to “‘err on the side of 
avoiding places that the probation officer or the court might deem 
unacceptable.’”209 
The justification for upholding the association restrictions is 
easier to grasp than the rationale for affirming the restriction on 
sexually stimulating material, apparently including legal adult 
pornography.210  This relates to the argument that the restriction on 
Internet usage denies access to legitimate, legal material, an 
argument to which some courts have been more sympathetic than 
others, depending in part on the relationship of the Internet use to 
 
 204 Cook, supra note 188, at 4 (stating that restrictions of association rights have been 
upheld based on the rationale that the association would encourage the individual to 
repeat criminal conduct). 
 205 162 F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 206 Id. at 1234. 
 207 In Crandon, for example, the defendant initiated a sexual relationship with a 
fourteen-year-old girl through the Internet. See supra notes 113–116 and accompanying 
text. 
 208 Bee, 162 F.3d at 1234–36. 
 209 Id. at 1235–36. 
 210 See United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 169–70 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting 
defendant’s argument that prohibition on accessing Internet is unacceptable because such 
a ban might impede legitimate uses of the Internet). 
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the offense.211  Furthermore, Bee involved overriding public safety 
concerns, as indicated by the court’s expectation that the defendant 
err on the side of caution by avoiding places that probably would 
be considered unacceptable, but that had not yet been designated as 
such.212  The courts in Crandon and Paul employed similar 
reasoning to affirm Internet ban conditions, based on the nature of 
the defendants’ respective Internet uses and the great potential for 
harm to the public, particularly children, if they were to revert to 
their former behavior.213 
The court in United States v. Loy reached a different 
conclusion with respect to legal adult material.214  In Loy, Ray 
Donald Loy was convicted for possession of child pornography, 
some of which he had a role in producing, with a sentence that 
included supervised release conditions prohibiting possession of 
any pornography and unsupervised contact with minors.215  The 
court upheld the contact element of the condition, excluding 
accidental contact such as in public places from the condition, but 
overturned the proscription on pornography, holding that it was 
overbroad.216  The court condoned a restriction on possession of 
even legal pornography, as in Bee, but it found that the restriction 
had to be more carefully crafted since, as originally drafted, the 
policymaking power was granted to the probation officer and the 
condition failed to put Loy on notice of what material he could or 
could not access.217  The court also noted that “[a] probationary 
condition is not ‘narrowly tailored’ if it restricts First Amendment 
freedoms without any resulting benefit to public safety.”218  Thus, 
while supervised release conditions may restrict fundamental rights 
 
 211 Compare United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2001) (vacating an 
Internet ban imposed on a felon who had pled guilty to bank larceny, was previously 
convicted of incest, and had accessed legal adult pornography on his home computer), 
with United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127–28  (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding Internet 
restrictions in light of fact that defendant used the Internet to develop an illegal sexual 
relationship). 
 212 Bee, 162 F.3d at 1234–36. 
 213 See supra Part II.B. 
 214 United States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 254 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 215 Id. at 254–55. 
 216 See id. at 254, 266–67. 
 217 See id. at 266–67. 
 218 Id. at 266. 
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in some instances, they should not do so unnecessarily.219  Yet, this 
is the potential result of imposing Internet bans that only permit 
use with probation officer approval, particularly where such use 
does not entail a direct threat to the public.  At the same time, 
however, such arrangements may provide less restrictive 
alternatives to blanket Internet bans.220 
Filtering Internet content and subjecting otherwise banned 
Internet use to probation officer approval are analogous to freedom 
of association limitations, since such conditions prohibit 
defendants from associating with certain people or accessing 
certain types of material.221  In Mitnick, the court rejected the 
defendant’s contention that the requirement of probation officer 
approval for access to computers and computer-related equipment 
was too broad: “The fact that Mitnick may engage in otherwise 
prohibited conduct with the probation officer’s approval makes the 
conditions imposed less restrictive [than] an outright ban on such 
conduct.”222  Yet, several of the courts emphasizing the 
pervasiveness of Internet use in modern society to reject blanket 
Internet bans have not been persuaded that allowing access through 
probation officer discretion is a mitigating factor justifying the 
condition.223  For example, the Sofsky court stated that “[a]lthough 
 
 219 See id. at 264 (stating that to avoid First Amendment infirmity, a probation condition 
must be narrowly tailored and directly related to the goals of protecting the public and 
promoting a defendant’s rehabilitation) (citing Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128).  The Supreme 
Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), opined on the purpose behind 
the requirement that laws be reasonably precise: 
First, because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly. . . . Second, . . . [a] vague law impermissibly delegates basic 
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis. . . . Third . . . where a vague statute abuts upon sensitive areas 
of basic First Amendment freedoms, it operates to inhibit the exercise of 
[those] freedoms. 
Id. at 108–09, noted in Loy, 237 F.3d at 262. 
 220 See Richtel, supra note 1 (discussing technologies allowing a probation officer to 
remotely monitor an offender’s computer activity). 
 221 See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 222 United States v. Mitnick, No. 97-50365, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 10836, at *3 n.1 
(9th Cir. May 20, 1998). 
 223 See supra notes 96, 104–05 and accompanying text. 
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the condition prohibiting Sofsky from accessing a computer or the 
Internet without his probation officer’s approval is reasonably 
related to the purposes of his sentencing, in light of the nature of 
his offense, we hold that the condition inflicts a greater deprivation 
on Sofsky’s liberty than reasonably necessary.”224  Furthermore, 
the court concluded that alternative methods, such as government 
sting operations or unannounced inspections of his computer, were 
available to enforce narrower Internet restrictions relating to 
Sofsky’s offense of downloading child pornography and would 
prevent the denial of access to legitimate uses of the Internet.225  
Thus, the courts in Mitnick and Sofsky reached very different 
conclusions with respect to permitting otherwise forbidden Internet 
access on the condition of probation officer approval, stemming 
from their views about the Internet and about the Internet’s relation 
to the offenses.226 
In a similar consideration of alternative ways to police Internet 
use, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in remanding 
White to determine the meaning of a sentencing court’s Internet 
use restrictions, explored the possibility of Internet filtering.227  
The Tenth Circuit found that the sentencing court’s conditions 
were potentially overbroad or too narrow.228  As part of this 
analysis, the court stated that installation of filtering software into 
a defendant’s computer appropriately could focus an Internet use 
restriction, but that such an approach was limited by the 
effectiveness of the technology and the possibility of 
circumvention by either the technologically savvy user or the user 
who simply decided to use a different computer.229  After 
cautioning against a blanket ban on computer use and commenting 
on the ubiquity of cyberspace, the court concluded that “any 
 
 224 United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002); see also United States v. 
Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Sofsky for the propositions that (1) 
probation officer approval does not make a ban on Internet usage less restrictive and (2) 
there are alternative methods of enforcing more limited use restrictions). 
 225 Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 126–27. 
 226 See supra notes 84–96, 109–12 and accompanying text 
 227 See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. White, 
244 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
 228 See White, 244 F.3d at 1205–07. 
 229 See id. at 1206–07. 
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condition limiting White’s use of a computer or access to the 
Internet must reflect these realities and permit reasonable 
monitoring by a probation officer,”230 without indicating how this 
should be achieved. 
Freedom of association restrictions largely have been upheld as 
long as they comport with the sentencing guidelines and goals, 
under which preventing criminal conduct and protecting the public 
are primary concerns and must be balanced against the liberty 
interests of the defendant.231  These decisions do not bode well for 
the constitutional challenge to Internet bans, which involve similar 
balancing due to both the nature of Internet use and its perception 
as a fundamental part of modern society.232  For example, the 
White court did not overturn the Internet ban based on the 
defendant’s First and Fourteenth Amendment arguments, but 
instead focused on the meaning of the condition and its potential 
for overbreadth, given the numerous legitimate and commonplace 
functions of the Internet.233And as the court in Crandon concluded, 
“in this case the restrictions on employment and First Amendment 
freedoms are permissible because the special condition is narrowly 
tailored and is directly related to deterring Crandon and protecting 
the public.”234  If courts are to reject Internet use bans, they are not 
likely to do so based on constitutional challenges, but rather on an 
evaluation of the competing interests of the defendant and the 
public.235 
2. Driving 
Another type of sentencing condition that relates to performing 
commonplace activities is the revocation of the driver’s license of 
a defendant, particularly with respect to driving under the influence 
(“DUI”) cases.236  As one article on license suspensions observed, 
 
 230 See id. at 1207. 
 231 See supra notes 193–213 and accompanying text. 
 232 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 233 See White, 244 F.3d at 1207; see also discussion supra Part II.A. 
 234 Crandon, 173 F.3d at 128. 
 235 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 236 See Carlos F. Ramirez, Note, Administrative License Suspensions, Criminal 
Prosecution and the Double Jeopardy Clause, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 923, 923 n.6 
(1996). 
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“the livelihood of the defendant and his or her family may be 
dependent on the ability to operate a motor vehicle.”237  The article 
further states that 
“[i]n this society where public transportation is either non-
existent or is, at best, inadequate and entire commercial 
shopping areas are located in suburbs surrounding our 
cities, [a driver’s license can no longer be viewed] as 
merely a privilege which is given by the State and which is 
subject to revocation at any time.”238 
This correlates to the arguments regarding the ever-increasing 
use of the Internet for employment-related purposes, since it has 
become essential to conducting many types of businesses, in 
addition to its value with respect to communications, research, and 
commerce.239  Those denied the use of computers and the Internet 
may be technologically immobilized, which can hurt their ability to 
compete, or perhaps even participate, in the modern economy.240  
Although filtering out Web sites related to the defendant’s offense 
or allowing partial access with probation officer approval may 
mitigate this effect, courts otherwise averse to blanket Internet 
bans have not been receptive to such conditions and have deemed 
them overbroad in any event.241 
Driver’s license suspensions in DUI cases, however, often have 
been upheld based on the interests in protecting the public and 
deference to the power of designated authorities to regulate 
licensed activities.242  The first reason for these sanctions, known 
as Administrative License Suspension (“ALS”),243 is to protect the 
 
 237 Id. at 943. 
 238 Id. at 950 (quoting Ohio v. Gustafson, No. 94 C.A. 232, 1995 WL 387619, at *5 (Ill. 
App. Ct. June 27, 1995) (affirming the trial court’s dismissal of DUI prosecution 
subsequent to the suspension of the defendant’s drivers license on double jeopardy 
grounds)).  Of course, “for the person living in a city with different modes of 
transportation, the harm may not be so great.  But, for the majority of people in this 
country, who live in suburbs or rural areas, this can cause substantial or total 
immobilization.” Id. at 950 n.181. 
 239 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 240 See, e.g., United States v. Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 241 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 242 See Ramirez, supra note 236, at 930–36, 951–52. 
 243 See id. at 923. 
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public by deterring drunk driving, both by prohibiting the 
defendant from driving and instilling fear that a license could be 
suspended as a result such an offense.244  The prohibition can be 
analogized to Internet restrictions, since it effectively prevents the 
defendant from using the tool with which he committed the crime.  
The DUI offense is the crime itself, however, and cannot be 
separated into distinct, criminal components, since neither driving 
a car nor drinking alcohol is by itself a crime.245  It is the 
combination of these elements that creates the crime.246  In 
contrast, the crimes for which many of the defendants in the 
Internet cases were convicted did not necessitate the use of the 
Internet, although it arguably facilitated the behavior in certain 
instances.247  Thus, unlike with DUI cases, it is possible with 
Internet-related offenses to separate the means by which the 
offense was committed from the crime itself.  Moreover, the 
defendants in the Internet cases, with the exception of Mitnick, 
were guilty of separate, underlying conduct for which there are 
criminal statutes unrelated to Internet technology.248 
 
 244 See id. at 932–33 (noting cases that have concluded that public safety justifies 
administrative license suspension statutes). 
 245 See, e.g., Villarini & Henry, LLP, So You Have Been Arrested for DWI in New 
York?, at http://villariniandhenry.lawoffice.com/articles.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2004) 
(listing the “critical elements” of a DWI conviction).  The above analysis assumes, 
respectively, that (1) the driver has a valid license and (2) the drinker is over twenty-one 
years of age. 
 246 See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TR. LAW § 1192 (McKinney 1996) (operating a motor vehicle 
while under the influence of alcohol or drugs). 
 247 E.g., United States v. Harding, No. 02-2102, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371 (3d Cir. 
Jan. 28, 2003); Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122; White, 244 F.3d 1199; see also supra text 
accompanying notes 163–65. 
 248 See, e.g., United States v. Freeman, 316 F.3d 386, 387 (3d Cir. 2003) (receipt and 
possession of child pornography); Harding, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1371, at *1 (receipt 
of child pornography); Sofsky, 287 F.3d 122, 124 (receipt of child pornography); United 
States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 157 (5th Cir. 2001) (knowing possession of child 
pornography); United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2001) (bank 
larceny, with prior conviction for incest); White, 244 F.3d at 1201 (receiving child 
pornography and violation of condition of supervised release); United States v. Crandon, 
173 F.3d 122, 124 (3d Cir. 1999) (receiving child pornography); see also discussion 
supra Part II. 
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The second significant reason advanced for the ALS sanction is 
that a driver’s license is considered a privilege and not a right.249  
This argument contends that “the government reserves the power 
to revoke a license if the licensee fails to act in accordance with set 
regulations.  In an ALS, the government merely exercises the 
power to revoke the driving privileges it has afforded.”250  Unlike 
driving, however, Internet use is not a regulated activity or 
privilege for which state permission is required.  It may not rise to 
the level of a right, but it is also difficult to argue that Internet use 
is a privilege granted by a certain entity, as it simply entails 
obtaining a connection from a commercial service provider, or 
availing oneself of any other connected computer terminal, for 
example, in a public library or at most educational institutions.251  
In sum, while the similarities between the nature of Internet use 
and of driving are clear, the reasons for restricting each activity 
subsequent to a criminal conviction are evidently quite different.  
Accordingly, it should be more difficult to restrict Internet use as 
the result of a conviction for an underlying crime that the Internet 
facilitated than it is to suspend a license due to driving under the 
influence, although courts apparently possess great discretion in 
both instances.252 
The comparison to other activities that have been limited by 
supervised release conditions offers a different perspective on 
Internet use restrictions.253  As demonstrated through the freedom 
of association challenges to supervised release conditions, the 
constitutionality of the condition is irrelevant as long as it is 
consistent with the criteria of the sentencing guidelines, criteria 
which afford courts broad discretion in determining constraints 
where the public interest is at stake.254  The analogy to driver’s 
 
 249 See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text; see also Ramirez, supra note 236, at 
935–36. 
 250 Ramirez, supra note 236, at 936 (citing State ex rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy, 904 P.2d 
1044, 1056 (N.M. 1995) (rejecting double jeopardy challenge to administrative license 
revocation hearing)). 
 251 See generally DEP’T OF COMMERCE, supra note 39, at 35–56 (discussing how and 
when Americans access the Internet and Internet use among young people). 
 252 See discussion supra Part I.A; see generally Ramirez, supra note 236, at 924–43 
(discussing conflicting judicial interpretations with respect to ALS proceedings). 
 253 See discussion supra Parts III.B.1–.2. 
 254 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
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license suspensions in the wake of DUI offenses is not persuasive, 
as key differences exist in the reasoning and authority behind such 
conditions.255  Nonetheless, the courts often have been granted the 
discretion to make their own decisions.256 
C. The Significance of the Underlying Crime 
Fashioning supervised release conditions entails a great tension 
between the interests of protecting the public and preventing too 
great a deprivation of liberty of the individual being sentenced.257  
This same tension applies to the Internet, since it has bestowed 
numerous benefits upon society as a whole, but also has created 
new crimes and new manners in which to commit existing 
crimes.258  The very sentencing guidelines from which this conflict 
emerges afford the courts a significant amount of discretion in 
crafting and reviewing the conditions intended to deter such future 
criminal conduct.259  Some courts have used this discretion 
ostensibly to prevent certain crimes in which the Internet is viewed 
as essential to their commission, by restricting or altogether 
forbidding Internet access.260  Other courts, however, have 
approached the issue differently, viewing the Internet as a part of 
everyday life and concluding that its deprivation risks too great an 
infringement on an individual’s liberty.261 
Courts should take care to limit Internet restrictions to those 
cases where the Internet was a necessary tool of the offense, 
without which the underlying crime could not have been 
committed.  The goal of the supervised release condition should be 
to deter the underlying conduct, not to restrict one of many 
methods by which the crime has been realized—especially when 
that method does not involve a weapon, per se, but a technology 
with abundant legitimate uses.262  In many cases, there is a fine line 
 
 255 See supra notes 246–48, 250–51 and accompanying text. 
 256 See Ramirez, supra note 236, at 930–36. 
 257 See supra notes 24–25, 28 for a description of the factors enumerated by the 
sentencing guidelines with respect to supervised release conditions. 
 258 See supra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
 259 See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 260 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 261 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 262 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
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between the use of the Internet to facilitate the crime and use that 
is merely incidental to its commission.263 
The threshold analysis, thus, should be whether the defendant 
could have committed the crime without going online to do so.  
For example, with respect to a hacking crime like that in Mitnick, 
the Internet was both a tool and a target of the crime, and could not 
have occurred otherwise.264  Crandon is a case where the 
distinction is less clear, as it is not evident that the defendant could 
have forged a relationship with his young victim without first 
befriending her anonymously in an online chat room, as such a 
relationship may have been rebuffed or altogether avoided in the 
physical world.265  In cases such as Sofsky and Harding, in which 
the crimes involved possession of child pornography, it is clear 
that while the Internet has certainly made such illicit material 
easier to come by, the defendants could have obtained it elsewhere.  
In view of the unique nature and extensive uses of Internet 
technology, courts should be wary of such distinctions and 
formulate supervised release conditions accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
Sentencing determinations entail a difficult balancing act, as 
they are highly fact-specific endeavors that often involve 
unsympathetic defendants whose liberty becomes less of an 
interest depending on the nature of the crime.  The willingness of 
courts to use their broad discretion to carefully examine the 
relationship of the underlying criminal conduct to the involvement 
of the Internet will likely depend on the extent to which they view 
the Internet as a fundamental resource, although, as demonstrated, 
public safety concerns often override such considerations.266  As 
the Internet’s importance to modern society continues to increase 
in the coming years and its relationship to individual liberty 
interests deepens, it will be interesting to examine the direction 
 
 263 See supra text accompanying notes 163–65, 247. 
 264 See supra text accompanying notes 159, 163. 
 265 See supra notes 114–16, 124, 169 and accompanying text. 
 266 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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courts follow in establishing supervised release conditions that 
restrict Internet use. 
 
